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IS MLS INHERENTLY
ANTICOMPETITIVE? THE STRANGE
SINGLE-ENTITY STRUCTURE OF
MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER IN ORDER
TO LEGITIMIZE AMERICAN
PROFESSIONAL SOCCER
DANIEL S. MACMILLAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Major League Soccer (MLS) is the U.S. Soccer sanctioned Division I
professional soccer league in the United States and Canada, and operates under
a unique corporate framework for a professional sports league.1 MLS is
organized as a limited liability company (“LLC”) under Delaware law, and
utilizes an exemption that allows it to organize the league’s corporate structure
as a single-entity.2
Given the global power of soccer and the attention that sports demand in
American popular culture, an uninterested party may expect that the United
States would not have an issue supporting a major, professional league for
soccer. Though soccer is commonly regarded as the most popular sport in the
world, this trend does not hold true in the United States.3 Basketball leads the
country in participation among youth athletes, and “American” football is by far
the largest revenue generating sport.4 Major League Soccer has a complicated
* Daniel S. MacMillan is a J.D. Candidate at Marquette University Law School and serves as the Articles
& Survey Editor for the Marquette Sports Law Review. He attended the University of Kansas and received a
B.A. in Political Science.
1. Professional Council, U.S. SOCCER, http://www.ussoccer.com/about/affiliates/professional-soccer
(last visited July 30, 2018).
2. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2002).
3. Most Popular Sports in the World, MOST POPULAR SPORTS IN THE WORLD, http://mostpopularsports.net/in-the-world (last visited July 30, 2018).
4. Bruce Kelley & Carl Carchia, “Hey, Data Data—Swing!”, ESPN (July 11, 2013),
http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/9469252/hidden-demographics-youth-sports-espn-magazine; Steven
Kutz, NFL Took in $13 Billion in Revenue Last Season — See How It Stacks Up Against Other Pro Sports
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history in the United States, and even today, despite its recent growth, many
fans are skeptical for the future of the league and for soccer in North America.5
This Comment examines the single-entity framework as employed by MLS,
and analyzes the reasons that MLS should transition to a corporate structure that
better allows for the legitimization of American soccer on an international level.
Further, this Comment will explore the anticompetitive nature of the
single-entity organization of MLS and how that relates to the control that
players have over their contracts, transfers, options, and designations. Since the
landmark decision in Fraser v. Major League Soccer, updates in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) have given a greater deal of control to the player,
but the existence of MLS’ quasi-single-entity status will continue to unfairly
restrict players’ freedom of movement and the right to sell their services to the
highest bidder.6 Though the players union has recently negotiated a
quasi-free-agency provision in the 2015 CBA, pursuing legal action in the First
Circuit Appeals Court will give players the strongest opportunity to prove the
anticompetitive effects of the single-entity system in court, and force the court
to exercise its jurisdiction in further defining the legal status of Major League
Soccer. This analysis will explore the nature of the single-entity status of MLS,
the relationship that players have with teams and their owners, and the basis for
a lawsuit that could potentially overturn the MLS single-entity structure for
good.
II. HISTORY OF MLS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCCER
Most national and international attention towards soccer comes from
well-established foreign leagues like the German Bundesliga, Mexico’s Liga
MX, and the English Premier League.7 The creation of the Division I American
professional league came with the awarding of the 1994 World Cup to

Leagues, MARKETWATCH (July 2, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-nfl-made-13-billion-lastseason-see-how-it-stacks-up-against-other-leagues-2016-07-01.
5. Emmett Knowlton, Despite Growth, MLS in a Catch-22 with Stars Young and Old, BUS. INSIDER (Feb.
23, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/mls-in-a-catch-22-with-stars-young-and-old-2016-2.
6. See Fraser, 284 F.3d 47; see also COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE
SOCCER AND MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS UNION, https://www.mlsplayers.org/images/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement%20-%20February%201,%202015.pdf (last visited July 30, 2018);
Steven Bank, Who Won the MLS Labor Negotiations? Single Entity, AMERICAN SOCCER NOW (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://americansoccernow.com/articles/who-won-the-mls-labor-negotiations-single-entity.
7. Christopher Harris, Most Popular Soccer Leagues on US Television, Ranked, WORLD SOCCER TALK
(Aug. 2, 2016), http://worldsoccertalk.com/2016/08/02/popular-soccer-leagues-us-television-ranked/; Joe
Tansey, Statistically Ranking the World’s Top 10 Football Leagues, BLEACHER REPORT (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1922780-statistically-ranking-the-worlds-top-10-football-leagues.
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America.8 The selection included a great deal of pressure from soccer’s
international governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA), to bring competitive soccer to North America and build rapport with
American sports fans.9
This was not the first attempt to bring professional soccer to the American
masses—the North American Soccer League (NASL) had become the first
league to reach Division I recognition, but had faded away due to
“wide disparities in the financial resources of the league’s independently owned
teams and a lack of centralized control.”10 In order to combat the failures of
NASL, USSF president Alan Rothberg founded Major League Professional
Soccer (MLPS) using a plan to keep centralized control over league and
individual team operations.11
After a successful World Cup, MLS was officially formed in 1995 as a
limited liability company (LLC) under Delaware law.12 The league is owned
by a group of independent investors and authority is consolidated under a board
of governors—this unique corporate structure ensures centralized control.13
Since the creation of the league, the power given to players has been widely
disregarded, and the legal formation of the league as a single-entity has
safeguarded the league and its individual owners from having to provide certain
labor protections that are widely used in other American professional sports.
Regardless, in his 2016 ‘State of the League Address,’ MLS commissioner Don
Garber stated that MLS “[r]emain[s] very focused on building a league that can
be one of the top leagues in the world and one that everybody who cares about
the game can be proud of.”14
A. The Single-Entity Framework and the Importance of the Fraser Decision
Major League Soccer operates very differently than the other major
professional leagues in America. Unlike the four major professional
sports—baseball, basketball, hockey, football— whose teams hold their own
entity status separate from the league itself, MLS league operates as a

8. Grant Wahl & Brian Straus, The Birth of a League: Key Figures from MLS’s Inaugural Season Relive
the League’s Humble Beginnings, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 2015, http://www.si.com/longform/2015/mls/.
9. Id.
10. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 52.
11. Id. at 53.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Alicia Rodriguez, WATCH: MLS Commissioner Don Garber’s 2016 State of the League
Address, MLS CUP PLAYOFFS (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2016/12/09/mls-commissioner-don-garber-hold-state-league-address-friday.
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single-entity LLC, with the twenty-two individual teams represented as
members of the board of governors.15 Centralized league governance is key to
ensuring a stable compensation market for player services, and to protect the
overall character of the league. While team owners assert that the single-entity
system is necessary for the continued existence of the league itself, player
advocates and industry critics argue the league’s corporate structure is not a
single-entity at all.16 Antitrust attorney Mark Levinstein calls MLS “[a] cartel
with a reserve clause that is executed by the teams agreeing to let the league be
the signatory on their contracts.”17
MLS has operated under an LLC single-entity framework since its
inception, and any successes in business correlate strongly with the league’s
success in court.18 Only years after MLS’ creation, a group of professional
soccer players including Iain Fraser, brought suit against MLS, nine
independent operator/investors, and the United States Soccer Federation
(“USSF”), alleging violations of Sherman Act sections 1 and 2.19 In 2000, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that under the
decision in Copperweld v. Independence Tube, MLS and its operator-investors
were uniquely integrated, and therefore did comprise a single-entity that would
exempt MLS from federal antitrust claims under Sherman Act Section 1.20 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals saw the case on appeal in 2002 and refused to
allow the district court’s rubber stamp of “single-entity” to stand without
scrutiny.21 It determined that MLS was “[a] hybrid arrangement, somewhere
between a single company (with or without wholly owned subsidiaries) and a
cooperative arrangement between existing competitors.”22 Therefore, MLS
could not be scrutinized under the Copperweld theory of parent-subsidiary, and
because plaintiffs were unable to satisfy certain procedural requirements of the
antitrust suit, the court was not obligated to exercise jurisdiction over the

15. Elizabeth Cotignola, Major League Loophole: A Look at MLS’s Shaky Single-Entity Status, SOCCER
WIRE (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.soccerwire.com/news/pro/mls/major-league-loophole-a-look-at-mlssshaky-single-entity-status/.
16. Jorge Arangure Jr., ‘It is Simply a Cartel’: The Story Behind MLS Winning the Labor Wars Against
Players, VICE SPORTS (Mar. 3, 2015), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/it-is-simply-a-cartel-the-story-behind-mls-winning-the-labor-wars-against-players.
17. Id.
18. Cotignola, supra note 15.
19. See Fraser, 284 F.3d at 53.
20. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); see also Fraser, 97 F. Supp.
2d at 132-33.
21. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 53.
22. Id. at 58.
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single-entity question at all.23 This decision was critical to the league’s
continued support of the single-entity system, and has significantly deterred
players seeking greater contract and freedom of movement rights from
challenging its ‘cartel-like’ structure in court.24
B. Free Agency Under the 2015 Collective Bargaining Agreement
As of February 1st, 2015, the MLS and the MLS Players Union signed a new
collective bargaining agreement that changed the landscape of professional
soccer in the United States.25 For the first time in league history, Major League
Soccer players will have the ability to become free agents, and there will be
greater amounts of money allocated to teams by the league itself.26
Sections 29.5 and 29.6 of the collective bargaining agreement define the
scope of MLS free agency.27 Players whose contracts have expired and those
whom have declined their player options for the next season, will be eligible to
participate in the newly created free agent market, subject to certain
limitations.28 Players that meet the requirements for free agency will be able to
negotiate their next contract under certain restraints imposed by MLS in the
2015 CBA.29 Players earning up to $100,000 in base salary may be
compensated at 125% of his previous year’s base salary; players earning
between $100,000 and $200,000 in base salary up to 120%; and players earning
more than $200,000 in base salary up to 115% or a greater percentage
determined under Section 29.8.30 While the free agency provisions included in
the new CBA give players a greater share of control over their contracts and
freedom of movement between league clubs, the mere existence of the
single-entity structure suppresses the potential value of that player’s contract.31
“The deal allows free movement, but it doesn’t let different divisions of the

23. Id. at 60-61.
24. Arangure Jr., supra note 16.
25. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER AND MAJOR LEAGUE
SOCCER PLAYERS UNION, supra note 6.
26. SI Staff, MLS, Players Union Ratify New CBA - Free Agency, Salary Details, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
July 16, 2015, https://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2015/07/16/mls-cba-players-union-ratify-free-agency.
27. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER AND MAJOR LEAGUE
SOCCER PLAYERS UNION, supra note 6, §§ 29.5 and 29.6.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 29.6(b)(iii). “Free Agency [] is available for Players who will be at least twenty-eight (28) years
old in the year in which the immediately preceding League Season concluded and have at least eight (8) MLS
Service Years.” Id.
30. Id.
31. Bank, supra note 6.
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single-entity artificially bid up the price in the absence of independent evidence
of market value via an offer from outside of the single-entity.”32
The inclusion of a free agency period is a large step toward further
protections for Major League Soccer players, but the work is far from over as
MLS still holds a great deal of power over the teams and players.33 It is very
difficult to have conversations about the fair market value of a player contract
when there is such a great amount of cooperation between the league and its
clubs. In discussing the outcomes of the 2015 CBA, UCLA Law Professor
Steven Bank asserts the difficulty of enforcing freedom of contract rights under
the single-entity structure:
Full, unrestricted, free agency of the kind now in operation in
post-Bosman European football is antithetical to the
single-entity structure. It requires a fully functioning market
with economically independent teams bidding on a player to
establish his market price. Even restricted free agency in
operation in most American sports leagues would still require
economically independent teams to bid on the players.34
Going forward with the new CBA,35 players should use the legal system and
the CBA to eventually fight for the elimination of the single-entity status in
Major League Soccer.
C. Bosman Ruling and its Effect on International Soccer
The case of Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v.
Bosman was a landmark decision that changed the landscape of international
soccer.36 Jean-Marc Bosman was a Belgian football player that challenged the
rights to his player contract before the European Court of Justice.37 After
completing the term of his contract with Belgian Club RFC Liège, Bosman
intended to test the market in order to sell his player services to another franchise
only to be blocked by RFC Liège.38 In response to the transfer request from

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Union Royale Belge des Sociétés, de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, Cour d’Appel [CA] [Court of
Appeal] Liège, Dec. 15, 1995, EUROPEAN COURT REPORTS [ECR] 1995, I-04921, C-415/93, 5040 (Belg.),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61993CJ0415&from=EN.
37. Bobby McMahon, Why the Bosman Ruling Never Brought the Chaos So Many Predicted, FORBES,
Dec. 15, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobbymcmahon/2015/12/15/the-threat-of-players-using-thebosman-rule-has-been-more-powerful-than-invoking-it/#62fe5c982004.
38. Id.
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Bosman, the club cut his salary and refused to transfer him to USL Dunkerque
of the French League.39 As a result of the case before the European Court of
Justice, the court held that a player at the end of his contract was entitled to sell
his services to any club within the European Union and that the former club was
not entitled to a fee upon that player’s transfer.40
This decision outlined the scope of a free agent market for European soccer,
and allowed for the greater access to rights over player contracts than had been
realized before. Though the Bosman case does not hold precedential value in
United States courts, it demonstrates that for a soccer league to be fully
competitive on an international stage, players must have the right to sell their
services to the highest bidder. Freedom of movement and a greater deal of
player control over contracts has undoubtedly raised the quality of soccer in
Europe,41 and there is no hope for the legitimatization of Major League Soccer
without a full-fledged free agency system in place.
D. The Designated Player Rule
The Designated Player Rule has been a large source of contention since its
creation in 2007, and is seen as a glaring example of the league’s stranglehold
on player movement and salary bidding.42 The league’s official definition of
the Designated Player Rule is as follows: “The Designated Player Rule allows
clubs to acquire up to three players whose salaries exceed their [salary cap]
budget charges, with the club bearing financial responsibility for the amount of
compensation above each player’s budget charge.”43
Designated Player slots are used both to retain current MLS players and
more importantly to acquire players from the international market.44 As it is
commonly known, the “Beckham rule” was first used in order for the LA
Galaxy to sign English superstar David Beckham to an MLS contract.45
Designated players are used as a tool of the league to balance competition and
ensure that certain teams are not left without premier talent and that others can

39. Id.
40. Id.; see Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921.
41. Aron Yassin & David Carlson, Player Movement, Club Football, and the National Game, SOCCER
POLITICS, https://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/research-projects/players-and-migration/player-movement-club-football-and-the-national-game/#fn-2281-5 (last visited July 30, 2018).
42. Cotignola, supra note 15.
43. MLS Communications, MLS Roster Rules and Regulations 2018, MLS: MEDIA RESOURCES, (Mar. 2,
2018), https://www.mlssoccer.com/league/official-rules/mls-roster-rules-and-regulations.
44. Id.
45. Cotignola, supra note 15.
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sustain players that will bring an overall benefit to the league itself.46 “The
‘Beckham Rule’ is a mechanism that assigned the maximum budget
charge–$400,000 in 2007 and $480,625 for 2017–against the club’s salary cap
with the additional salary being the sole responsibility of the team owner.”47
While this may seem like a righteous aim on the part of the league, its effects
have denied significant rights to players and has left MLS in a precarious
position when arguing in favor of its single-entity protection. Prior to the 2007
MLS season, only three players were bringing in a salary of over $400,000.48
In his 2015 article for Sports Illustrated, Michael McCann explained that
the Designated Player Rule “enables MLS clubs to spend far above the
salary cap in order to secure the services of a superstar player who would
otherwise play in a more lucrative league.”49 Payments to designated players
are mostly taken on by the individual clubs via their operator-investors, which
suggests that there a degree of autonomy by league clubs from its parent MLS.50
The Designated Player Rule is a direct competitor to the idea of creating a
true free agency system. A free agent market must be occupied by economically
independent entities that are able to bid for player services amongst
themselves.51 This is directly opposed to the judicial rationale that has allowed
MLS to continually operate as a single-entity.52 “If the teams are economically
independent, . . . then MLS would likely flunk the single-entity defense for
antitrust purposes.”53
III. OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
A. Section 1 Jurisdiction Requirements
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that every contract,
combination, or conspiracy that is a restraint of trade or commerce shall be
illegal in order to protect the consumer welfare and to encourage competition.54

46. See generally id.
47. Weston Jenson, MLS History: The Beckham Rule and the Rise of the Designated Player, SB NATION
(Feb. 19, 2017), http://www.rslsoapbox.com/2017/2/19/14331556/beckham-rule-designated-player.
48. Id.
49. Michael McCann, In Pursuit of Free Agency, Players Could Challenge MLS’ Single-Entity
Status, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 26, 2015, https://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2015/01/26/mls-cba-playersunion-free-agency-single-entity-lawsuit.
50. Id.
51. See generally id.
52. Id.
53. Bank, supra note 6.
54. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
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In order for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a Sherman Act claim, the
conduct in question must (1) be a concerted action; (2) that causes an
unreasonable restraint; (3) of interstate trade or commerce.55 According to the
decision issued in the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals in Fraser v.
Major League Soccer, MLS and its operator-investors comprise a single-entity,
and thus cannot meet the concerted action requirement for jurisdiction under
Section 1.56 Section 1 prohibits price-fixing and tries to encourage economic
actors to make decisions individually and let the market decide the other forces
at play.57
B. MLS Unique Single-Entity Structure and an Analysis of Fraser and
Copperweld
The case of Fraser v. Major League Soccer was the first major litigation
surrounding antitrust law and the power MLS holds over its players.58 As
discussed above, unlike other professional leagues, the MLS operates as a
“single-entity” and has an applied immunity through legal precedent and the
history of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
MLS has, to say the least, a unique structure, even for a sports
league. MLS retains significant centralized control over both
league and individual team operations. MLS owns all of the
teams that play in the league (a total of 12 prior to the start of
2002), as well as all intellectual property rights, tickets,
supplied equipment, and broadcast rights. MLS sets the teams’
schedules; negotiates all stadium leases and assumes all related
liabilities; pays the salaries of referees and other league
personnel; and supplies certain equipment.59
This, however, is not the norm for sports leagues, and single-entity status
has often been rejected in other circuits.60 In opposition to those jurisdictions
that have struck down the single-entity structure, the First Circuit relied heavily
on their interpretation of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
holding that “[M]LS and its operator-investors were uniquely integrated and did
55. Id.
56. Fraser, 284 F.3d 47.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 53.
60. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388–90
(9th Cir. 1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256–58 (2d Cir. 1982);
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1185–86 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543
F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976).
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comprise a single-entity.”61 Because their actions were not of a type from which
they could benefit directly, independent of the league’s success, the league and
its operator-investor run clubs are still considered to be a single economic unit
in terms of federal antitrust law under Section 1.62
The ruling in the Fraser decision was based largely on the court’s
interpretation of a case that had nothing to do with sports. In Copperweld, the
US Supreme Court determined that a business entity was not subject to Section
1 if there existed a “complete unity of economic interest.” Chief Justice Berger
explains that if a parent company has 100% control of the subsidiary in
economic terms, we can treat them as one.
[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their
objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate
actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate
consciousnesses, but one.63
This is how the courts currently treat the MLS—organized as an LLC, the
Board of Governors is comprised of operator-investors from each league club
and the interests of the league and its individual clubs are not considered to be
divergent.
After the decision in Fraser, soccer players in the American professional
league were discouraged and frightened that MLS would continue to take
advantage of their skilled labor. American soccer has grown and as the MLS
continues to expand there should be more attention brought to the wellbeing of
the player. The MLS Board of Governors’ concerns for league protection were
once well-founded, but if the MLS wants to be recognized as a legitimate
professional league by the world soccer community it must sacrifice a degree of
control to the benefit of their greatest commodity–the players. The 2015 CBA
contains more protections for the players, even though the provisions are
tempered to fit MLS’ single-entity status.

61. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 56.
62. Cotignola, supra note 15.
63. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
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IV. BREAKING THE SINGLE-ENTITY: ANALYSIS OF THE FRASER AND
COPPERWELD DECISIONS
A. Fraser v. Major League Soccer
In the 2002 Fraser decision, players were unable receive an analysis under
the non-per-se rule for antitrust challenges as Fraser was unable to establish a
showing that the league possessed significant market power so that the league
would be found to be unreasonably restraining competition.64 According to the
precedent set in the First Circuit, players would need to show that, (1) MLS
exercised significant market power, (2) in a properly defined market, and (3)
that the practices in question adversely affected competition in that market. If
the players were able to prove these three elements, they must prove that the
adverse effects on competition outweighed the competitive benefits for the
league.65
B. American Needle v. NFL
So what has changed since Fraser, and why would the First Circuit treat
another challenge any differently? Since the Fraser decision, the entire
landscape of the league has changed and MLS has moved further away from
being considered a “single-entity.”66 At the league’s inception there were a total
of twelve teams, and the league needed to ensure that it was not going to
crumble in the years following its creation.67 The 2008 decision of American
Needle v. National Football League offers a strong precedent against the idea
that a professional sports league can be founded, and continue to operate, under
the framework of the single-entity corporate structure.68
In American Needle, the US Supreme Court determined that the National
Football League and its associated apparel company were not to be considered
a single-entity in order to act as a bar to antitrust claims under Section 1.69
Defendant apparel vendor, American Needle, Inc., argued that because NFL
teams individually owned the rights to logos and trademarks, their licensing
contract with Reebok to produce exclusive apparel was a concerted action in

64. See Fraser, 284 F.3d 47.
65. Augusta News Co. v. Hudson News Co., 269 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2001).
66. Cotignola, supra note 15.
67. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 53-54.
68. See Am. Needle, Inc., v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
69. Id.
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violation of Section 1.70 In his opinion, Justice Stevens explains the true nature
of NFL teams under the league system.
NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decision making
quality or the single aggregation of economic power
characteristic of independent action. Each of them is a
substantial, independently owned, independently managed
business, whose “general corporate actions are guided or
determined” by “separate corporate consciousnesses,” and
whose “objectives are” not “common.”71
MLS can provide stronger showings of centralization and cooperation
between the league and its clubs than the NFL, and the decision in American
Needle does not bolster the idea that professional sports leagues are justified in
organizing as a single-entity.72 Justice Stevens continues to write, “[t]he teams
compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for
gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel.”73
Arguably, MLS clubs compete in a very similar manner. Clubs are competing
for wins, fan support, ticket sales and more every time they make a decision. It
is likely that the precedential value handed down in American Needle can aid
MLS players in their quest to gain control over their player contracts and
freedom of movement.
C. The “Sham Test” for Exempting Businesses from Antitrust Action
The Fraser court interpreted the Copperweld decision to give no basis for
piercing the corporate veil and allowing a full examination of the corporate
structure of MLS.74 The Fraser court concluded that the players’ argument
portraying MLS as a sham toward the end of horizontal price fixing was without
merit and that “[t]he extent of real economic integration is obvious.”75
In his article 2001 article for the Marquette Sports Law Review, Professor
Michael Waxman argues that the Copperweld decision was not about “piercing
the [corporate] veil” and that the court incorrectly applied the holding to the
facts of the case.76 Waxman argues that the Fraser court went too far in

70. Id.
71. Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 196.
72. McCann, supra note 49.
73. Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 196-97.
74. See Fraser, 284 F.3d 47.
75. Id. at 59.
76. Michael P. Waxman, Fraser v. MLS, L.L.C.: Is There a Sham Exception to the Copperweld Single
Entity Immunity?, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 487, 493 (2001).
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extending the protections of corporation law through the Copperweld decision,
and moreover, that the Copperweld decision was wrongly interpreted in the case
of a professional sports league.77
In analyzing the role of MLS
operator-investors as shareholders, the Fraser Court discussed the findings from
the lower court.78 “[T]he district court stressed that both sides of the supposed
conspiracy were parts of the same corporate entity; and it noted that ‘unlike
MLS, NFL football clubs do not exist as part of an overarching corporate
structure.’”79
Precedent from the US Supreme Court suggests that when a single-entity is
formed with the purpose of avoiding a classification under the law, that the
entity should not be considered a single-entity for purposes of antitrust law.80
Here the avoidance of antitrust law claims would likely fit the requirement of a
“clear legislative purpose.”81
D. Fraser Incorrectly Applies the Copperweld “Sham Test”
The Copperweld case doesn’t discuss bridging the gap between antitrust law
and corporate law.82 The Court does address and hold that a parent and its
“wholly owned subsidiary” will be considered a single-entity, but the
Copperweld decision did not consider the line of analysis under the “sham
test.”83 Judge O’Toole was too quick to accept incorporation on its face as a
sufficient basis for avoiding the full single-entity sham test.84 Thus, creating a
broad antitrust exemption for all businesses that qualify as a single-entity.85
Further, the sham exception is necessary to prevent corporate abuse under
Section 1.86 Incorporation should not be a full and immediate bar to antitrust
challenges—there must be an exception that analyzes parent companies and
their wholly owned subsidiaries.87 In Copperweld, the court sidesteps the
question of conspiracy and determines that “[a]ny anticompetitive activities and
their wholly owned subsidiaries may be policed adequately without resorting to
77. Id.
78. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 56.
79. Id.
80. Waxman, supra note 76, at 494; see Schenley Distillers Corp. v. U.S., 326 U.S. 432 (1946).
81. Schenley Distillers Corp., 326 U.S. 432 (1946); Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710, 717
(7th Cir. 1965).
82. Waxman, supra note 76.
83. Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752.
84. See generally id.
85. Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752; Waxman supra note 76.
86. Waxman, supra note 76.
87. Id.

MACMILLAN - FINAL.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE)

516

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

10/4/18 6:23 PM

[Vol. 28:2

an intra-enter-prise conspiracy doctrine.”88 This argument in favor of the MLS
single-entity structure as applied by the court in the Fraser decision was based
on the landscape of the league in 2002. If a court were to revisit the issue and
take an extended look at the lack of unity of economic interest between MLS
and its league clubs, the policy approach applied by the court in Fraser should
not apply to the MLS of today. If MLS was subjected to the “sham” defense to
antitrust immunity in it would be necessary to do a full valuation of MLS’
corporate structure to determine if the sole purpose of the single-entity structure
was to gain an exemption from antitrust law under Sherman Act Section 1.
E. Using the “Sham” Test to Access Antitrust Claims
The First Circuit Court should use the “Sham Test” to determine that MLS’
single-entity structure is insufficient to act as a full bar to Antitrust claims. In
their challenge of the MLS’ corporate structure, Ian Fraser and other MLS
players argued that the single-entity structure is merely a sham to allow for
horizontal price fixing among league clubs.89 According to the decision in
Schenley Distillers Corporation v. U.S., “[o]ne does not have the choice of
disregarding the corporate entity in order to avoid the obligations which the
statute lays upon it for the protection of the public.”90 Categorical standards
should not be a means by which a corporate entity can overcome all antitrust
challenges in a world of open markets.91 Using the “sham test” to analyze the
single-entity structure will reveal the true nature of this unique corporate
structure—to escape liability from antitrust claims under Section 1.
The Fraser court declined to exercise its jurisdiction in 2002 for deciding if
the single-entity structure of MLS would hold up under a full Rule of Reason
analysis because there was such an obvious unity of economic interest.92
Application of a full Rule of Reason analysis would reveal the anticompetitive
effects that the single-entity structure has on player salaries and their freedom
of movement between league clubs. The MLS today is much different than it
was at the time the Fraser decision was handed down in 2002.93 McCann
asserts that “[a]s MLS has become more popular in the U.S., clubs have become

88. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 776-77.
89. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 59.
90. Schenley Distillers Corp., 326 U.S. at 437.
91. Waxman, supra note 76.
92. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 59.
93. MLS has grown significantly since its inception. See Ahiza Garcia, Major League Soccer’s Plan to
Become Truly Major, CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/news/mls-growth-dongarber/index.html; see also Sam Stejskal, A Look Back at the History of MLS Expansion, MAJOR LEAGUE
SOCCER (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2017/02/28/look-back-history-mls-expansion.

MACMILLAN - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

MLS SINGLE-ENTITY STRUCTURE

10/4/18 6:23 PM

517

competitive with each other and seemingly more autonomous.”94 Further, the
application of the Designated Player Rule, in practice, exemplifies the departure
from MLS’ complete unity of economic interest, as league clubs compete
against each other in many different aspects. Moreover, the American Needle
decision suggests that it is time for the court to reconsider the necessity of the
single-entity.
The court recognized the dangers of horizontal cooperation between
operators and investors, but distinguished the situation of the MLS from the case
in Copperweld without deciding what legal approach to actually take.95 This
line of reasoning offered by the court is confusing, and the courts allowance of
the “hybrid” entity is an injustice done onto the players.
The court declined to exercise its jurisdiction because the players were
unable to establish the basis for a Section 1 claim under a per-se Rule of Reason
analysis.96 Further, the players could not establish a case for anticompetitive
behavior under the non per-se or full Rule of Reason analysis.97 Using the
“sham test” to pierce the corporate veil will allow the court to find that MLS
and its league clubs are conspiring against the players to restrict player salaries
and freedom of movement.
F. Per Se/Quick Look Rule of Reason Analysis
There may be a renewed argument to apply the “per se Rule of Reason”
which requires a much lower bar to reach, rather than subjecting the MLS
procedures to the full Rule of Reason analysis. The per se rule uses a
presumption of illegality and the plaintiff must only prove that there is an
agreement.98 If an agreement is found to exist, the per se rule of reason analysis
suggests that the agreement implicitly violates antitrust law under Section 1.99
The Fraser court concluded that MLS’ fragile nature necessitates
collaborative structure—if the league were to fail, salaries would drop, which
does not increase competition among players in the market.100 However, this
rationale does not hold true today. The league is more popular than ever before

94. McCann, supra note 49.
95. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 58.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Matthew Mitten, Why and How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided O’Bannon v. NCAA, 62
ANTITRUST BULL. 62 (2017).
99. Id.
100. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 59.
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and is expanding very quickly.101 If players continue to play with suppressed
salaries and without full rights to freedom of movement and contract, there is
no way for the league to reach its full potential and compete on an international
level.102 Though the Bosman case will not hold precedential value in the First
Circuit, players should argue that the MLS must protect their rights as has been
established in foreign soccer. It is evident that as the league expands it will only
increase its already dominant market power in the US and Canada and will
further deprive players of the full market value of their services. While it is
unlikely that a court will infer market power, the players should assert
anticompetitive effects using a full Rule of Reason analysis.
G. Non Per-Se/Full Rule of Reason Analysis
If the First Circuit again declined to apply the per-se or ‘quick look’ Rule
of Reason analysis, the court should conclude that a full Rule of Reason analysis
is necessary to determine if the single-entity framework caused anticompetitive
effects in the marketplace. The decision handed down in Fraser affirmed the
single-entity framework employed by the MLS in order to centralize control
over the league and its players.103 This decision continues to hold precedential
value and protects the league’s single-entity status for purposes of the Sherman
Act. At the time of the Fraser decision, the league was comprised of just twelve
teams and was struggled to maintain a competitive balance between league
clubs.104 In its justification of the single-entity structure, the league argued that
under a free market approach, only the most affluent teams would acquire the
best available players, upsetting the competitive balance and threatening the
earning potential and growth of the league as a whole.105 However, in 2017,
Major League Soccer will operate with twenty-two league clubs, and a plan to
expand to twenty-eight teams by the year 2022.106 The expansion of the
Designated Player Rule has all but replaced the role of free agency in the process
of acquiring players from foreign leagues and gives an unfair advantage to
players with established prestige and the clubs that can afford them.107 While

101. Thomas Barrabi, Is Major League Soccer Scoring with Fans?, FOX BUSINESS (June 2, 2016),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/06/02/is-major-league-soccer-scoring-with-fans.html.
102. Cotignola, supra note 15.
103. Fraser, 284 F.3d 47.
104. Id. at 53.
105. See generally Fraser, 284 F.3d 47.
106. Brian Straus, MLS Expansion: In-Depth Look at All Cities, Bids for Growth to 28, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 21, 2016, http://www.si.com/planet-futbol/mls-expansion-prospective-cities-bids-28teams.
107. See generally Cotignola, supra note 15.
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salaries continually increase for the league’s top players, nationals and
non-designated players are not reaping the benefits of the league’s continued
growth.
A full Rule of Reason analysis requires a case-by-case, fact specific analysis
in which the Plaintiff must plead and prove the anticompetitive effects of the
challenged league restraint.108 If players (plaintiffs) are able to prove that
anticompetitive effects exist, the burden shifts to the league (defendants) to
prove that the conduct or restraint achieves a procompetitive effect.109 The
inquiry continues, and the plaintiff must then respond with a showing that the
restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive effects, or that
those procompetitive effects can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive
manner.110 At this stage in the inquiry, the trier of fact must attempt to balance
the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects to determine the net effect on the
situation.111 If the jury determines that the anticompetitive justifications
outweigh the procompetitive justifications, the conduct in question shall be
considered to be an unreasonable restraint of trade, and therefore is illegal
because of its negative effect on consumer interests.112 If the inverse is true, the
court will uphold the conduct providing a net benefit for the consumer
marketplace.113
Courts have provided examples of acceptable procompetitive justifications
for restricting consumer choice in the market under federal antitrust law.114
These include maintaining competitive balance between league clubs by
increasing inter-brand competition and ensuring that the league remains
financially viable.115 Conversely, courts will not accept any conduct that results
in a reduction of player safety or any measure that aims solely to increase
profitability by the league and its clubs.116
Application of a full Rule of Reason analysis would give the players a
greater chance to prevail in a court of law and strike down the single-entity
defense. The Rule of Reason analysis attempts to determine whether the
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes and is no more

108. Mitten, supra note 98.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Mitten, supra note 98.
114. See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
115. See generally Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. 183.
116. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Mitten, supra note 98.
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restrictive than necessary.117 Here, the players would argue that a free market
approach and a corporate structure where teams compete against themselves for
the good of the league would be a less restrictive manner in which to organize
the league. Players would need to prove, most likely using a market analysis,
that a corporate structure more akin to that of the NFL or NBA would (1) lead
to increases in player salaries, and (2) an increase in ability for players to move
from club to club.118
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Though Major League Soccer continues to grow as a professional league in
America, there is no easy solution to give power back to the players and ensure
that their rights as employees are not violated and that the labor they provide is
used in the best way possible by league management. The analysis of the
single-entity system under the framework of the Fraser decision will ultimately
hinge on the net effects of league governance. Nevertheless, there are certain
labor protections and bars to antitrust claims that must be overcome before
players can successfully bring suit in the First Circuit.
A. Labor Protections
There are multiple protections available to the players that believe they are
being treated unfairly by league governance, and to league governance that
believes it is being treated unreasonably by its players. First, the statutory labor
exemption (SLE) protects players’ rights to collective bargaining and to use a
strike as a tool to force the hand of the league in negotiating terms between the
players and the league.119 On the side of the league, the statutory labor
exemption immunizes multi-employer collective bargaining and other conduct
like lockouts.120 The statutory labor exemption does not immunize jointly
agreed CBA terms, rather, the SLE protects unilateral action—the
Non-Statutory Labor Exemption (NSLE) will protect agreed upon terms.121
Second, the NSLE extends beyond impasse because of the ongoing collective
bargaining relationship.122 The basis of this is a collective agreement between

117. Mitten, supra note 98.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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league clubs and the players’ union if impasse is reached in collective
bargaining, there is no agreement.123
B. Prerequisites to Antitrust Suits: Disclaimer or Decertification of Players’
Union
If the players were to bring a claim in the form of an antitrust lawsuit under
Section 1 before the expiration of the current CBA, the claim would be barred
by the non-statutory labor exemption.124 The labor exemption will continue to
exist and act as a bar to antitrust claims until the bargaining relationship between
the league and the players’ union is terminated either by a disclaimer of interest
NLRB by decertification.125 The NSLE applies only to league clubs and its
players, and only considers parts of the agreement that were bargained for at
arms-length. If the NSLE applies, antitrust claims are barred.126 This promotes
the freedom to bargain and to contract between the league and its players.127 In
the Fraser decision, players were not forced to decertify the union, as there was
no union present.128 For a claim under the current structure of the collective
bargaining relationship, players would need to need to act in one of two ways:
(1) submit a claim for decertification to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), or (2) have the players’ union publicly disclaim their authority to
represent the players in collective bargaining.129 Both methods have been
effective in clearing the way for an antitrust suit, but a judgment from the NLRB
is seen as a more concrete method of decertifying the players’ union and
removing authorization to bargain on behalf of the players.130
C. Bringing an Antitrust Suit Against MLS
The proposed solution to break up MLS’ single-entity structure
once-and-for-all would come in the form of a player-based lawsuit against MLS.
This would require MLS players to decertify or disclaim the services of the
players’ union. It is unlikely the players could take action until the expiration
of the current collective bargaining agreement, but at the end of the term players
should submit a claim to the NRLB and move to bring suit against MLS. This

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See generally Fraser, 284 F.3d 47.
129. Mitten, supra note 98.
130. Id.
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is not without significant risks—there is no guarantee that the court will accept
the “sham test” to piece the corporate veil. Moreover, it is impossible to tell
how the court will come out when analyzing the net benefit or harm of the
single-entity itself.
In order to overcome the presumption of legality after the Fraser decision,
a lawsuit against the MLS alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act must
outline the specific anticompetitive effects of the single-entity league structure.
In the new age of MLS, the league would be better suited for long-term growth
and establishing an international prestige if it were to re-structure the league.
To this end, I propose that the MLS works to eliminate the single-entity
status that has been used to create a “cartel-like” atmosphere in American
professional soccer.131 Here, players organized against MLS would have to
plead and prove that the anticompetitive effects of restricting player movement
and freedom to contract are caused by restraints imposed under the league’s
single-entity system. This can be accomplished by (1) showing clear
anticompetitive effects of league-imposed limits like team salary caps and
maximum individual player salaries, (2) showing with market analysis that the
product is restrained by the conduct in question, and (3) defining the geographic
area in which players can find alternative employment.132 Plaintiffs would need
to show actual negative effects on the price or quantity compared to the results
of an unrestrained, free market.133
First, using the “sham” argument as advanced by Professor Waxman,
players would prove that the single-entity structure is used solely for the basis
of avoiding antitrust claims and suppressing player salaries and freedom of
movement. Second, players would need to prove that there is no lesser
restrictive within the single-entity structure to achieve the same procompetitive
effects. Here, there is no way to effectively bid up player salaries when league
clubs exist as a single entity under the league.
The arguments asserted on behalf of the league will revolve around the
concept of league stability as the net benefit of restricting player wages and
freedom of movement. MLS was created in order to protect against antitrust
claims from the players, and ensure that centralized control of the league would
lead to future prosperity. Though this logic was sufficient to convince the First
Circuit that the single-entity should remain, the past and current growth of the
league point to a decentralization of economic interest between league clubs and
a strong base to sustain a transition period into a fully free market approach.
Conversely, players’ must recognize that there are real opportunities for player
131. See Arangure Jr., supra note 16.
132. Mitten, supra note 98.
133. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 59.
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salaries to rise to a level that is unsustainable for some clubs in a free market
league organization. If league clubs are forced to overspend in order to compete
against each other, it could destabilize the league to the point of no return.
If indeed the players are successful in pleading and proving the
anticompetitive effects of the single-entity, it may be beneficial to put in place
some restrictions on free agency and player movement and rearranging a salary
cap during or until the end of the 2022 expansions, or as a condition of the next
collective bargaining agreement. Though this may be seen as minimal progress,
the elimination of the single-entity league structure would pave the way for
stronger competition in the global market for soccer players, and would likely
lead to legitimatization and further growth of MLS. Moving forward, this would
give MLS a better opportunity to grow its brand and expand its global influence
into the international soccer landscape.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current state of Major League Soccer is volatile, and without strong,
transparent leadership to encourage competition for players by league clubs,
MLS players will continue to be looked down upon by the outside world, and
the MLS will continue to hold massive power over its athletes. The existence
of the Designated Player Rule acts as a pseudo-free agency mechanism that only
works to benefit the most well-paid players, and those clubs that are able to
acquire such players.
It has become increasingly difficult to argue that league clubs, through their
operator-investors, have a complete unity of interest. While this scenario
existed and was acknowledged in the Fraser decision, the decision not to
analyze the anticompetitive effects under a full Rule of Reason inquiry is
detrimental to fairness under existing federal antitrust protections in Section 1.
If players were to bring an amended suit in the First Circuit, it would be unlikely
that the court would again decline to exercise its judgment in applying a full
Rule of Reason analysis to determine if the single-entity is in fact
anticompetitive.
While it is impossible to predict the outcome of the court’s balancing of the
potential anti and procompetitive effects, MLS players should not stand idly by
and accept the small concessions for quasi-free agency that were granted in the
2015 CBA. Players should be justified in their fears of work stoppage, but
should not wait for the expiration of the current agreement to organize and
develop a plan to secure greater rights to contract and move freely. If players
are unsuccessful in pleading and proving the anticompetitive effects of the
single-entity structure, the reemergence of players’ rights will likely lead to
further concessions from the league. With further investigation into the market
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for MLS players and the continued expansion of the league, the issue of
increased players’ rights will be brought to the forefront of the conversation.
Even if the players are not willing to bring the issue to the First Circuit,
organization of a lawsuit under this rationale can be used leverage in future labor
negotiations with MLS.

